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This study examined the relationship between military outlay and economic growth in the Lake 
Chad Basin countries of Nigeria and the Republic of Chad respectively by testing the causal link 
between these two principal variables. The data ranges used for Nigeria and Chad were 1981-
2019 and 1983-2019 respectively. The econometric method employed for this study was the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag Bounds approach to cointegration. The results revealed that 
Nigeria’s military outlay exerted a positive and insignificant relationship with economic growth. 
However, the Republic of Chad’s military outlay had a positive and significant link with economic 
growth. The results of the causality test showed that there was no causal relationship between 
real GDP per capita and military outlay in both Nigeria and the Republic of Chad. These findings 
for Nigeria and Chad imply that they can pursue the policy objectives of defence and economic 
growth independently. The study, thus, recommends that the policymakers of the governments of 
both countries should pursue the policy objectives of defence and economic growth independently. 
Furthermore, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt 
Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), charged with the responsibility of 
fighting corruption should rise to the occasion and track down military officials that divert 
defence funds for individual gains in Nigeria. 
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Contribution of this paper to the literature 
This study through the results of the Toda and Yamamoto Multivariate Causality Test showed 
that the policy objectives of defence and economic growth can be pursued independently in 
Nigeria and the Republic of Chad. 
 
1. Introduction 
The attention of researchers in defence economics, a branch of economics that gained recognition in World 
War II has continued unabated to this day. The impact of military outlay on economic growth has continued to be 
an issue of great debate after a pioneering work by Benoit (1973); Benoit (1978) that showed a positive link 
between military outlay and growth in the least Developed Countries (LDCs). This had resulted in the burgeoning 
of literature either in criticism of Benoit's findings or in defence of it. 
The nexus between military outlay and economic growth is a very critical issue considering the current level of 
insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin Countries that had resulted in the forced displacement of people considered 
among the world's greatest displacement catastrophe and high level of governments spending particularly, military 
spending through the Multinational Joint Task Force by the countries affected by the Boko Haram conflict. No 
wonder, World Bank and UNHCR (2016) in one of their findings stated that: 
The Boko Haram insurgency is the greatest single cause of displacement in the Lake Chad region with over 2.5 
million people becoming a refugee or an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) as a result of it. This crisis alone 
accounts for 70 per cent of the total number of people displaced in the four countries (World Bank & UNHCR, 
2016). 
However, the outcome of a good number of empirical studies was conflicting or inconsistent. Narayan and 
Singh (2007) stated, ''The Keynesian school of thought contends that an increase in the military burden stimulates 
demand, increases purchasing power and national output, and creates positive externalities''  (p. 395). In contrast, 
the Classical school of thought are of the view that an expansion of military outlay hinders economic growth. This 
is because military outlay crowds out private investments due to high-interest rate. Again, a reduction in aggregate 
demand as a result of a rise in military outlay reduces consumption (Feeny, 2005).  The response of the various 
governments in the conflict-affected countries is military. However, the political will to end the wave of insecurity 
in the Lake Chad Basin is lacking. From the angle of the Nigerian government, there is no sincerity in the fight 
against the Boko Haram insurgency.  
Hence, military spending had multiplied in the four countries in the Lake Chad region that are bounded by 
Lake Chad as a result of insecurity. This opinion affirms the argument of Luca (2007) that the desire to guarantee 
peace and economic growth results in increased military spending. This is not surprising since the eleventh 
cardinal objective of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) is ‘’to make cities and human settlements inclusive, 
safe, resilient and sustainable’’ (Osborn, Cutter, & Ullah, 2015). Furthermore, aligning with the view of Feeny 
(2005) the perceived threat from Boko Haram had resulted in increased military spending with a reduction in 
investments that could improve the welfare of these countries. These countries are Cameroon, the Republic of 
Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Dunne, Smith, and Willenbockel (2005) maintained that war and the absence of security 
are among the major impediments to development. However, there is no evidence to show whether the huge funds 
allocated for military spending in the Lake Chad Basin Countries promotes economic growth or retards it.  
The observed phenomenon of the rise of military expenditure among these countries bounded by Lake Chad, 
together with the numerous opinions about the nexus between military outlay and growth, made the subject of the 
association in the context of two of these countries in the Lake Chad region very appealing. This study will 
contribute to the existing body of literature and serve as a platform for more study on this subject. Again, the 
outcome of the study may inform policy on the reallocation of resources from unproductive to productive sectors of 
the Lake Chad Basin Countries to motivate economic growth. However, to the best of our knowledge, the previous 
studies in this area are sparse. This investigation intends to study the link between military outlay and economic 
growth in the Lake Chad Basin countries of the Republic of Chad and Nigeria since they are connected 
geographically.  
Despite the increase in military expenditure over time in these countries bounded by Lake Chad, there has been 
a fluctuation in economic growth. On average, the trend in the rate of growth of military expenditure and the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate is unclear. This scenario requires an investigation of the impact of 
military outlay on economic growth. The questions to answer in this study are: What is the causal link and 
direction of causality between military expenditure and economic growth in the Republic of Chad and Nigeria? The 
main objective of this study is to investigate the causal link and direction of causality between military outlay and 
economic growth in the Republic of Chad and Nigeria.  
Besides, the introduction, the rest of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 depicts the literature review 
and theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the methodology. Section 4 will dwell on data presentation, analysis 
and discussion of results while section 5 will focus on conclusion and policy recommendations. 
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Empirical Literature 
A plethora of literature has investigated the link between defence outlays and economic growth at cross-
country and country by country level for developing and developed countries of the world using diverse 
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methodologies. For illustration, applying the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and simulation method from 1970 
to 2008, Anfofum (2011) investigated the nexus between defence outlays and economic growth in Nigeria.  The 
results revealed that defence outlays had a positive and significant effect on agriculture, output of oil and gas, and 
social services sectors. However, it had a negative impact on the output of manufacturing. Furthermore, defence 
outlays had a positive and significant impact on economic growth, non-oil exports, oil export, and public 
investment in Nigeria. The findings of the policy simulation revealed that the impact of defence outlays on the 
endogenous variables were alike. For instance, economic growth, the output of agriculture, the output of oil and 
gas, and the output of social services were positive and significant. However, the output of manufacturing remained 
negative.  
Likewise, Tiwari and Shahbaz (2011) used the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) method of 
cointegration to probe the impact of defence expenditures on economic growth in India. The findings signalled a 
positive impact of defence expenditures on economic growth. However, defence expenditures exerted a negative 
effect on economic growth after an endpoint. The result of Granger causality revealed a bidirectional causality 
between defence expenditures and economic growth. In another similar study and applying the Three-Stage Least 
Squares (3SLS) in the framework of the augmented growth model of Solow, Chairil, Sinaga, and Febrianti (2013) 
investigated the link between military spending and economic growth in the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) region with emphasis on Indonesia. The findings revealed that military expenditure impacted 
economic growth positively. The causality result showed that there is a bidirectional causal relationship between 
military spending and economic growth in Indonesia. 
Also, this survey comprising of almost 170 works conducted by Dunne and Tian (2013) extended and updated 
an initial literature survey on the association between military spending and economic growth. It revealed that 
current studies employing data as far back as the end of the cold war provided progressively robust evidence of the 
generally negative impact of military spending on economic growth. Similarly, Haseeb (2014) used the ARDL 
bounds testing method to cointegration from 1975 to 2010 to investigate the link between defence spending and 
economic growth and considered the likelihood of defence spending being utilized as an instrument for stabilization 
of macroeconomics denoted as the Military Keynesianism Hypothesis in Pakistan. The findings revealed that 
defence spending had a negative effect on economic growth. The findings imply that Military Keynesianism 
Hypothesis does not hold for Pakistan.  
Apanisile and Okunlola (2014) in the same way used the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Technique (ARDL) to 
cointegration from 1989 to 2013 to examine the short-run and long-run impact of military expenditure on growth 
in Nigeria. The study also confirmed whether military spending is an economically non-contributive activity in the 
contemporary world as proposed by Dumas (2002). The findings revealed that military expenditures exerted a 
negative and significant impact on economic growth in the short run. However, its effect on economic growth was 
positive and significant in the long run.  Contrary to the suggestion of Dumas (2002) the study concluded that 
military spending is an economically contributive activity. Utilizing panel data technique from 2005 to 2012, Feeny 
(2005) also studied the link between military expenditures and economic growth in 10 countries in the 
Mediterranean region. The findings revealed that military spending exerted a negative impact on economic growth 
in these countries.  
Furthermore, employing techniques of exogenous growth and dynamic panel data on a large and balanced 
panel data from 1988 to 2010 for a pool of 104 countries, Dunne and Tian (2015) investigated the impact of 
military expenditure on economic growth. The findings showed a significant negative effect of military spending 
on economic growth for the entire sample. However, the impact was greater in countries in Africa. The results 
indicated an undeniable degree of heterogeneity. Furthermore, it showed that the effect of military spending on 
economic growth was insignificant for middle-income countries in Africa, countries in Africa that never suffered 
conflict, non-African countries with natural resources abundance, and non-African countries whose economies are 
reasonably closed. 
Using the augmented Solow model, fixed effect estimator or the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) and 
employing current data from 1988 to 2015 for a group of 61 countries, Arshad, Syed, and Shabbir (2017) in a 
related study explored the joint impact of military expenditure and armed conflicts on economic growth. The 
results showed that military expenditure and arms imports exerted a negative effect on per capita GDP. However, 
military spending had a negative and significant effect on economic growth where external conflicts exist.  
Ajmair, Hussain, Abbassi, and Gohar (2018) in another study used time series data throughout 1990-2015 and 
the ARDL technique to cointegration to investigate the short-run and long-run nexus between military spending, 
number of persons in military and economic growth in Pakistan. The findings revealed that military spending in 
Pakistan had a positive and insignificant relationship with economic growth. However, number of persons in the 
military exerted a positive and significant relationship with economic growth in the long run. The short-run result 
showed that military spending and the number of persons in the military had a positive and significant link with 
economic growth. 
Raju and Ahmed (2019) used the Engle-Granger cointegration technique in a similar study to investigate the 
short-run and long-run nexus between military spending and economic growth in India, Pakistan and China using 
1980-2017, 1989-2017 and 1989-2017 respectively as ranges of data. The long-run results showed that military 
spending had a positive relationship with economic growth in the three countries. However, the short-run results 
revealed the absence of a link between military spending and economic growth in the three countries. The causality 
results showed a unidirectional causal relationship from military spending to economic growth in the three 
countries. 
Utilizing the heterogeneous panel causality test, Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and System 
Generalized Method of Moments techniques and using data from 1990-2015, Saba and Ngepah (2019) as well 
examined the causal link between military spending and economic growth for a balanced panel of 35 countries in 
Africa. The results of the causality test conducted on a country by country basis showed: unidirectional causal 
relationship from military spending to economic growth in two countries; unidirectional causality from economic 
growth to military spending in 14 countries; bidirectional causality in 12 countries and no causal link between 
military expenditure and economic growth in seven countries. Cetin and Guzel (2019) on the same subject used 
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panel econometric models from 1990 to 2017 to examine the nexus between military spending and economic 
growth in the Middle East and North African (MENA) Countries. The result revealed a negative and significant 
relationship between military spending and economic growth in MENA countries.  
Evidence from past studies on the nexus between military outlay and economic growth in the context of 
developing and developed countries of the world has revealed inconsistent results. Smith (1994) and Mintz and 
Stevenson (1995) argued that shortcomings in theory and methodologies are the probable reasons for disagreement 
in the literature. However, Alexander (1990); Ram (1995) and Alptekin and Levine (2012) opined that the use of 
different datasets, periods and empirical models are principally responsible for the diverse results. The attention of 
the majority of the studies was on developed countries. However, developing countries were mainly included in 
cross country studies. Most of the studies were cross-sectional studies.  On the other hand, country-specific studies 
utilizing time series techniques were few.   
Furthermore, evidence from previous literature showed that the inability to generalize the link between 
military outlay and economic growth for all countries prompted some scholars to unearth joint features for 
countries that are alike. Relying on their commonalities, they grouped countries as non-conflict and conflict states 
(Looney, 1988b) dependent on geography (Gyimah-Brempong, 1989) regional sensitivity (Heo, 1996; Kollias, 1994; 
Kollias, 1995; Kollias & Makrydakis, 1997; Ocal, 2002) organization (Hassan, Waheeduzzaman, & Rahman, 2003) 
being high/low growth or developed/developing countries (Benoit, 1978; Biswas & Ram, 1986; Dakurah, Davies, & 
Sampath, 2001; Deger, 1986) countries that are experiencing foreign-exchange constraints, and countries which are 
well-endowed with resources (Looney & Frederiksen, 1986b).  
The nexus between military outlays and economic growth was found to be positive by some scholars (Ajmair et 
al., 2018; Ando, 2008; Anfofum, 2011; Apanisile & Okunlola, 2014; Atesoglu & Mueller, 1990; Babin, 1986; Benoit, 
1978; Biswas, 1993; Bose, Haque, & Osborn, 2003; Candar, 2003; Chairil et al., 2013; Frederiksen & McNab, 2001; 
Halicioglu, 2004; Hassan et al., 2003; Kennedy, 1983; Mueller & Atesoglu, 1993; Stewart, 1991; Tiwari & Shahbaz, 
2011; Ward, Davis, Penubarti, Rajmaira, & Cochran, 1991; Weede, 1983; Yildirim, Sezgin, & Öcal, 2005). Others 
found a negative relationship (Abu-Bader & Abu-Qarn, 2003; Arshad et al., 2017; Brasoveanu, 2010; Cetin & Guzel, 
2019; Deger, 1986; Deger & Smith, 1983; Dunne, 2010; Dunne, Nikolaidou, & Smith, 2002; Dunne & Tian, 2013; 
Dunne, 2012; Faini, Annez, & Taylor, 1984; Feeny, 2005; Galvin, 2003; Guaresma & Reitschuler, 2003; Haseeb, 
2014; Heo, 2010; Hou, 2010; Hou & Chen, 2013; Iftikhar ul Husnain & Shaheen, 2011; Karagol & Palaz, 2004; 
Kentor & Kick, 2008; Klein, 2004; Lim, 1983; Mylonidis, 2008; Sezgin & Yildirim, 2002; Shahbaz, Afza, & Shabbir, 
2013; Smith & Tuttle, 2008; Tekeoglu, 2008).  
Some scholars found no relationship (Adams, Behrman, & Boldin, 1991; Aizenman & Glick, 2006; Alexander, 
1990; Benoit, 1973; Biswas & Ram, 1986; DeRouen, 1994; Gerace, 2002; Habibullah, Law, & Dayang-Afizzah, 2008; 
Huang & Mintz, 1990; Huang & Mintz, 1991; Kinsella, 1990; Park, 1993; Payne & Ross, 1992; Ward & Davis, 
1992). In the contention of Brasoveanu (2010) the results of some studies vary. It might reveal either positive or 
negative correlations between military outlay and economic growth (Biswas & Ram, 1986; Chowdhury, 1991; 
Guaresma & Reitschuler, 2003; Heo, 1998; Karagol & Palaz, 2004; Looney, 1988a, 1988b; Looney & Frederiksen, 
1986b; Wilkins, 2004). However, it is common in cross-country studies.  
Furthermore, the previous studies revealed that there are four types of causal relationships between military 
expenditure and growth. These are unidirectional causality from military outlay to economic growth, 
unidirectional causality from economic growth to military outlay, bidirectional causality between military outlay 
and economic growth and no causality between military outlay and economic growth. The review of the literature 
showed that several studies have explored the nexus between military outlay and economic growth. However, the 
studies that investigated the impact of military outlay on economic growth in the Republic of Chad and Nigeria 
were sparse. Therefore, this study intends to contribute to the prevailing literature by examining the link between 
military outlay and economic growth in the context of the Republic of Chad and Nigeria since they are connected 
geographically and currently experiencing conflicts. 
 
2.2. Theoretical Review 
There is no agreement in terms of theory regarding the effect and causal link between military outlay and 
economic growth. Dunne and Coulomb (2008) argued that the absence of a generally accepted theory among 
scholars in economics has led to the incorporation of military expenditure into growth by diverse schools of 
thought. Hence, there are four main theories in the literature for examining the impact of military outlay on 
economic growth. These are Neoclassical, Keynesian, Institutional and Marxist theories. These theories have 
advocated numerous connections between military outlay and economic growth that can be broadly categorized 
into supply-side effects, demand-side effects and security effects.  
The neoclassical theory believes that the state is a rational actor that equalizes the opportunity costs and 
security benefits of military outlay to maximize national interest. The shortcoming of this theory is that it merely 
focuses on the probable outside enemy of the state thereby disregarding the internal responsibility of the military. 
Biswas and Ram (1986) claimed that the Feder-Ram model is the most prominent strand of the neoclassical theory. 
However, in recent times, it was severely criticized by Dunne et al. (2005). One of the flaws of this theory is that it 
disregards the demand side on the assumption that it is in equilibrium with the supply constraints of the economy. 
Furthermore, it believes that physical labour and capital are the only components of the production function 
(Nikolaidou (1999). This eliminates the element of human capital such as education, talent and acquired skills from 
the output equation. Another flaw is the restriction of the model due to its concentration on the two-sector model. 
This implies the government and export sectors should be added to that model. Besides, multicollinearity between 
the share in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and growth rate of each of the sectors is unavoidable, and hence,  
The estimates may not provide a good feel for the magnitude of the externality effect and/or the 
productivity differences and …. as is common with most single-equation models, there are some 
measurement and data problems and there may be 'feedback' from the dependent variable to some of the 
regressors (Ram, 1995).  
Nikolaidou (1999) argued that regardless of the limitations of the Feder-Ram model, their advantages that 
outweigh their defects should not be overlooked. On the other, hand, the Keynesian and Institutional models that 
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relate military outlays to economic growth through the supply and demand side conduits proposes that when the 
state uses its funds for military expenditure, economic growth is boosted through the multiplier process in the face 
of weak aggregate demand (Dunne & Uye, 2010). Hence, increased investment and economic growth results from 
increased capacity utilization and increased profits caused by military spending (Faini et al., 1984). Hence, provided 
that military outlay is autonomous, this model justifies the military expenditure.  
The Marxist theory emphasizes the importance of military outlay in the growth of the capitalist economic 
system through the sustenance of effective demand and avoidance of a drop in the rate of profit (Coulomb & Bellais, 
2008). Thus, as a result of military expenditure, economic breakdown and crisis are averted. Several components of 
this theory diverge in their management of the crisis, the role of military outlay in the development of capitalism 
and the role of the military-industrial complex in the class struggle.  
The under consumptionist approach, for instance, argues that military outlay is critical in foiling realization 
crisis that results from excessive growth of productive forces and output over the growth of effective demand 
thereby putting pressure on wages. Thus, by incorporating capital with no reduction in wages and conserving 
profit, military expenditure counteracts the crisis (Dunne, 1990). In the contention of Smith (1977) and Coloumb 
(2004) despite the influential nature of this approach in the literature of economic development, empirical studies in 
this approach have been limited to developed countries. 
 
2.3. Theoretical Framework  
Feder (1983); and Feder (1986) model for the analysis of the link between exports and economic growth in 
developing countries adopted by Biswas and Ram (1986) for a cross-country investigation of the relationship 
between military outlay and economic growth was used in this study. The model was utilized as a result of a direct 
relationship from theory to econometric specification. Again, the model depicts the externality effect of military 
production outlay on production of the civilian sector. Hence, following Maingi (2010) with some modifications, 
this theoretical model for the analysis of the link between military outlay and economic growth follows Dunne et 
al. (2005) model. 
The model is a two-sector model comprising of output of the military (M) and output of the civilian (C). Capital 
(K) and labour (L) allocation in these sectors is such that:  
𝐾 = 𝐾𝑀 + 𝐾𝐶                                                                                 (1) 
and 
𝐿 = 𝐿𝑀 + 𝐿𝐶                                                                                       (2) 
M was incorporated into the output equation of the civilian sector C in Equation 3 to capture the externalities 
associated with the defence sector. This externality effect can either be in form of a positive marginal product for 
defence in Equation 3 or as a relative factor productivity differential for capital and labour in both sectors. 
𝐶 = 𝐶(𝐾𝐶 , 𝐿𝐶 , 𝑀)                             (3) 
𝑀 = 𝑀(𝐾𝑀 , 𝐿𝑀)                                (4) 
Where KC, KM, LC, LM are inputs of capital and labour allocated to civilian and military production activities 
respectively.  






= (1 + 𝛿)                          (5) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛿 > 0 𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (𝑡ℎ𝑒  
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝛿 < 0) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿 ≠ 0 
Hence, the total supplies of capital and labour based on Equations 1 and 2 is:  
𝑌 = 𝑀 + 𝐶                                              (6) 
Substituting Equations 3 and 4 into Equation 6, yields: 
𝑌 = 𝑀(𝐾𝑀 , 𝐿𝑀) + 𝐶(𝐾𝐶 , 𝐿𝐶 , 𝑀)          (7) 

















𝑑𝑌 = 𝑀𝐾𝑑𝐾𝑀 + 𝑀𝐿𝑑𝐿𝑀 + 𝐶𝐾𝑑𝐾𝐶 + 𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝐶 + 𝐶𝑀𝑑𝑀 
Rearranging the result yields: 
𝑑𝑌 = 𝑀𝐾𝑑𝐾𝑀 + 𝐶𝐾𝑑𝐾𝐶 + 𝑀𝐿𝑑𝐿𝑀 + 𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝐶 + 𝐶𝑀𝑑𝑀               (8) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒: 
𝑀𝐾 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝐾 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝐾 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑀 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 
𝑀𝐿  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝐿 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝐿 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑀 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 
𝐶𝑀 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
From Equation 5: 
𝑀𝐿 = (1 + 𝛿)𝐶𝐿                             (9) 
Substituting Equation 9 into Equation 8 and rearranging: 
𝑑𝑌 = 𝑀𝐾𝑑𝐾𝑀 + 𝐶𝐾𝑑𝐾𝐶 + 𝑀𝐿𝑑𝐿𝑀 + 𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝐶 + 𝐶𝑀𝑑𝑀 
𝑑𝑌 = 𝑀𝐾𝑑𝐾𝑀 + 𝐶𝐾𝑑𝐾𝐶 + 𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝑀 + 𝛿𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝑀 + 𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝐶 + 𝐶𝑀𝑑𝑀 
Rearranging yields: 
𝑑𝑌 = 𝑀𝐾𝑑𝐾𝑀 + 𝐶𝐾𝑑𝐾𝐶 + 𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝑀 + 𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝐶 + 𝛿𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝑀 + 𝐶𝑀𝑑𝑀 
𝑑𝑌 = 𝑀𝐾𝑑𝐾𝑀 + 𝐶𝐾𝑑𝐾𝐶 + 𝐶𝐿(𝑑𝐿𝑀 + 𝑑𝐿𝐶) + 𝛿𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝑀 + 𝐶𝑀𝑑𝑀                   (10) 








𝑑𝑀 = 𝑀𝐾𝑑𝐾𝑀 + 𝑀𝐿𝑑𝐿𝑀                       (11) 
Substituting Equation 9 into Equation 11 yields Equation 12 
𝑑𝑀 = 𝑀𝐾𝑑𝐾𝑀 + (1 + 𝛿)𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝑀           (12) 
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𝑑𝑀 − 𝑀𝐾𝑑𝐾𝑀 = (1 + 𝛿)𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝑀            (13) 






𝑑𝐾𝑀 = 𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝑀              (14) 
Substituting Equation 14 into Equation 10 and collecting like terms yields: 






𝑑𝐾𝑀] + 𝐶𝑀𝑑𝑀 






𝑑𝐾𝑀] + 𝐶𝑀𝑑𝑀 












𝑑𝐾𝑀] + 𝐶𝑀𝑑𝑀 






] + 𝐶𝑀𝑑𝑀 
𝑑𝑌 = 𝐶𝐾𝑑𝐾𝐶 + 𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝐶 + 𝑀𝐾𝑑𝐾𝑀 + 𝑑𝑀 − 𝑀𝐾𝑑𝐾𝑀 + 𝐶𝑀𝑑𝑀 
𝑑𝑌 = 𝐶𝐾𝑑𝐾𝐶 + 𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝐶 + (1 + 𝐶𝑀)𝑑𝑀                      (15) 
Supposing there is a linear link between the marginal products of labour in each sector and the average output 





𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑑𝐾𝐶
= 𝐼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 15 𝑡𝑜 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒: 
 
𝑑𝑌 = 𝐶𝐾𝐼 + 𝐶𝐿𝑑𝐿𝐶 + (1 + 𝐶𝑀)𝑑𝑀                     (16) 










































                                (17) 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝐾 = 𝛽, (1 + 𝐶𝑀) = 𝛾 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑑𝐿𝐶
𝐿
















= 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 
𝐼
𝑌
= 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐷𝑃 
𝑑𝐿𝐶
𝐿
= 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒 
𝑑𝑀
𝑌
= 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐷𝑃 
Equation 18 is similar to Ram (1986) economic growth equation and would form the basis for estimation of 
empirical model in the methodology. 
Hence, this theoretical framework forecasts that growth (dY/Y) depends on gross fixed capital formation as a 
share of GDP, growth rate of the labour force (dLC/Y) and military expenditure as a percentage share of GDP. 
 
2.4. Trend of Real Gross Domestic Product and Military Outlay in Countries in the Lake Chad Basin       
2.4.1. Trend of Real Gross Domestic Product and Military Outlay in the Republic of Chad 
 
 
Figure-1. Military outlay as a share of GDP and annual growth rate of GDP, 1983-2019. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) database. 
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The trend in military outlay as a percentage of GDP and annual growth rate of GDP in the Republic of Chad 
for the study period is shown in Figure 1. The GDP growth rate of the Republic of Chad recorded positive values 
from 1983-1985, 1988-1989, 1994-1998, 2001-2015 and 2018-2019 respectively. The growth rate of 2018 was a 
sign of recovery after deep recessions in two years. However, it recorded negative values from 1986-1987, 1990, 
1993, 1999-2000 and 2016-2017 respectively. The drop in international prices of oil accounted for the recessions of 
2016 and 2017 respectively. The rates of growth between the annual rate of growth of GDP and military outlay 
varies. However, the GDP growth rate has been growing at a better rate than military outlay. The highest growth 
rate of GDP was recorded in 2004. On the other hand, the lowest growth rate of the economy was in 1993. 
Military outlay as a percentage of GDP maintained positive values throughout the study period. In recent times, 
the economy of the Republic of Chad has been fragile and vulnerable to volatility in oil prices and insecurity in the 
Lake Chad region. The landlocked status of Chad had impeded its economic progress seriously. It relies on the 
Cameroonian seaports for exports and imports.  The extensive corruption in Cameroon most often results in 
inflation in the costs of transportation of exported and imported goods and services. 
 
2.4.2. Trend of Real Gross Domestic Product and Military Outlay in Nigeria 
 
 
Figure-2. Military outlay as a share of GDP and annual growth rate of GDP, 1981-2019. 
Source: World Bank WDI database. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the trend in military outlay as a percentage of GDP and the annual growth rate of GDP in 
Nigeria for the study period. The GDP growth rate of Nigeria recorded positive values for most of the years under 
review. However, it recorded negative values from 1981-1984, 1993-1995 and 2016 respectively. The negative 
GDP growth rates from 1981-1984 were as a result of a drop in Nigeria's economic fortunes (Mordi, Englama, & 
Adebusuyi, 2010). This period was characterized by a serious drop in the international prices of oil. The negative 
growth rate of 2016 resulted in a recession. The recession was caused by foreign exchange restrictions, 
unfavourable economic policies, low production and a drop in oil prices in the international oil market. However, 
the situation was worsened by attacks on oil and gas facilities in the Niger Delta region by militants. GDP growth 
turned positive in 2017 as oil prices recovered and output stabilized. 
The rates of growth between the annual rate of growth of GDP and military outlay varies. However, the GDP 
growth rate has been growing at a better rate than military outlay. The highest growth rate of GDP was recorded 
in 2002. On the other hand, the lowest growth rate of the economy was in 1981. The GDP growth rate for 2014 
was remarkable. In that year, Nigeria became the leading economy in Africa. From 2003- 2019, military outlay as a 
percentage of GDP was almost 0 per cent. The annual growth rate of GDP declined from 1981 to 1984. It recorded 
zero values for 1986 and 1991. However, it exhibited an upward and downward trend from 1987-1990. 
 
3. Methodology and Model Specification 
Our empirical estimation will start with a modified version of Equation 18 specified as Equation 19, with 













+ 𝜇𝑡                                        (19) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒: 
𝜇𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 
This study would build on Saba and Ngepah (2019) model with some modifications. On the basis of modified 
growth model of Ram (1986) an empirical model for the analysis of the link between military outlay and economic 
growth is specified as Equation 20 and has the following form: 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶 = 𝑓(𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹, 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃, 𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁)                                              (20) 
𝑊ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒: 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶 = 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 
𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹 = 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐷𝑃 
𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃 = 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐷𝑃 
𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐷𝑃 
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 The long-run model for estimation is: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡) =∝ +𝛽1𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡                (21) 
The study used secondary data ranges from 1981 to 2019 and 1983 to 2019 for Nigeria and the Republic of 
Chad respectively. The time frame for the study was based on the availability of data. In the case of the Republic of 
Chad, the data on military expenditure as a percentage share of GDP were not available for 1991 and 2012 
respectively. Hence, extrapolation was employed to fill the gap. The time series data on growth rate of the labour 
force was not available. Hence, it was dropped. All the data were derived from World Bank's (WB), World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. The study used the Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) method of 
cointegration elaborated by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001). The Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
(PP) unit root tests were employed to check the time-series properties of the data prior to the economic growth 
equation estimation. Definitions, measures, sources and expected signs of the variables used in this study are shown 
in Table 1. 
 
Table-1. Definitions, measures, sources and expected signs of variables utilized in this study. 
Variables Definition and/or proxy Data Source Expected Sign 
Dependent Variable    
GDP per Capita growth rate 
(RGDPPC) 
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita (Constant 2010 US$) 
WB, WDI Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables    
Gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of 
GDP). Proxy for physical capital or 
investment 
WB, WDI + 
Military expenditure (MILEXP) Military expenditure as a percentage 
share of GDP 
WB, WDI - 
Trade openness (TOPEN) The openness of the economy was 
measured by exports plus imports as a 
percentage share of GDP 
WB, WDI + 
 





∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡−𝑖) + ∑ ∝2
𝜌
𝑖=1







∆𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡−𝑖) + 𝛽2𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡−𝑖
+ 𝜇𝑡                              (22) 
Where p and Δ denote the lag length and difference operator. α0 and µt signify the drift and disturbance term. 
The parameters of the short-run dynamics are α1, α2, α3, and α4. On the other hand, β1, β2, β3 and β4 are the 
parameters of the long-run relationship.    
The null and alternative hypotheses of no cointegration and cointegration respectively can be verified by 
comparing the computed F-statistic with critical value bounds for the lower bound I(0) and upper bound I(1) 
respectively. In Equation 22, the coefficients that would be verified under the null and alternative hypotheses of no 
cointegration and cointegration between economic growth and the causal factors are stated as: 
𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 0 
against: 
𝐻1: 𝛽1 ≠ 𝛽2 ≠ 𝛽3 ≠ 𝛽4 ≠ 0 
If the F–statistic is below the critical value for the lower bound I(0), the conclusion would be absence of 
cointegration and no long-run relationship. On the other hand, If the computed F–statistic exceeds the critical 
value bounds for the upper bound I(1), the conclusion would be the existence of cointegration among the variables. 
Hence, a long-run relationship exists. However, if the value of the F–statistic is between the lower I(0) and upper 
I(1) bounds, the test is considered inconclusive. 
If cointegration does not exist among the variables, the procedure would cease. However, short-run and long-
run parameters would be estimated if there is cointegration among the variables. The long-run model to be 





∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡−𝑖) + ∑ ∝2
𝜌
𝑖=1







∆𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡                   (23) 
The evaluation of the error correction model would be the last step. Thus, the specification of the short-run 
dynamic in ARDL form can be obtained through the construction of an error correction model linked with the 
long-run estimates as shown in Equation 24. 
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∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡−𝑖) + ∑ ∝2,𝑖
𝜌
𝑖=1







∆𝑇𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜋𝑒𝑐𝑚𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡             (24) 
Where α1, α2, α3, α4 are the short-run dynamics parameters, π represents the speed of adjustment and ecmt-1 
denotes the error correction term. The speed of adjustment is expected to be negative and significant to verify the 
existence of cointegration among the variables.  
 
4. Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussion of Results 
4.1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) Unit Root Tests Results on Series 
      
Table-2. ADF and PP unit root tests results. 
Country Variable Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Phillips-Perron (PP) 
  Level First 
Difference 
I(d) Level First 
Difference 
I(d) 
Nigeria Log(RGDPPC) -0.9450 -3.8744*** I (1) -0.3115 -3.8745*** I (1) 
 GFCF -3.6171*** - I (0) -3.5398*** - I (0) 
 MILEXP -4.7338*** - I (0) -5.8790*** - I (0) 
 TOPEN -2.3082 -7.4777*** I (1) -2.2206 -8.0386*** I (1) 
Chad Log(RGDPPC) -0.9895 -5.3997*** I (1) -1.0598 -5.4073*** I (1) 
 GFCF -2.5844 -5.5364*** I (1) -1.8033 -5.3236*** I (1) 
 MILEXP -2.1152 -6.4923*** I (1) -2.2039 -6.5014*** I (1) 
 TOPEN -1.5561 -9.1811*** I (1) -2.2767 -9.2988*** I (1) 
Note: *** indicate statistical significance at the 1% level of significance. 
 
The ADF and PP unit root tests results are shown in Table 2. The results for Nigeria revealed that the 
variables were either I(0) or I(1). The variables (GFCF and MILEXP) were integrated at the level I(0) whereas the 
remainder were integrated at the first difference I(1). On the other hand, the unit root results for the Republic of 
Chad showed that all the variables were integrated at the first difference. Since the regressors for Chad exhibited 
only I(1) and those for Nigeria showed a mixture of I(0) and I(1), the application of the ARDL approach is justified. 
The PP test for unit root confirmed the ADF results. 
 
4.2. Results of Diagnostic Tests for ARDL Model 
 
Table-3. Diagnostic results for ARDL model. 
Country: Nigeria 
Test Test Statistic P-value Null Hypothesis Conclusion 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test 
0.1455 0.8654 Ho: No serial correlation Cannot reject Ho 
Ramsey RESET test 0.7727 0.4476 Ho: Correctly specified Cannot reject Ho 
Jarque-Bera normality test 4.6326 0.0986 Ho: Normal distribution Cannot reject Ho 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH 1.0565 0.4346 Ho: Homoscedasticity Cannot reject Ho 
Country: Chad 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test 
8.1592 0.0026 Ho: No serial correlation Cannot reject Ho 
Ramsey RESET test 0.7553 0.4584 Ho: Correctly specified Cannot reject Ho 
Jarque-Bera normality test 0.1859 0.9113 Ho: Normal   distribution Cannot reject Ho 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH 1.4169 0.2307 Ho: Homoscedasticity Cannot reject Ho 
   
Table 3 revealed the diagnostic tests results for the ARDL model. The diagnostic test for Nigeria showed that 
the model specification was adequate and had a good fit. The results revealed that the ARDL model passed all the 
diagnostic tests. The ARDL model specified for the Republic of Chad passed all the diagnostic tests except the 
Breuch Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for serial correlation. However, there was presence of serial 
correlation in the ARDL model due to the significance of the F-statistic. Under the Ramsey Regression Equation 
Specification Error Test (RESET) test, the null hypothesis for linearity or correct specification was accepted due to 
the non-statistical significance of the f-statistic and t-statistic. Under the normality test, a Jarque-Bera value of 
0.1859 which was less than 5.99 showed that the errors were normally distributed. Again, the non-significance of 
the Jarque-Bera statistic confirmed it. It resulted in the acceptance of the null hypothesis of normal distribution. 
Under the ARCH test, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity was accepted as a result of a probability value of 
0.2307.  
 
4.3. Results of the Bounds Test for Cointegration 
The results of the Bounds tests for the presence of cointegration were shown in Table 4. The calculated F-
statistic for the combined test of the parameters in the empirical design for the Republic of Chad was 7.0852. This 
F-statistic exceeds the upper critical value bounds at 1%, 5% and 10% critical values. Based on this, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration was rejected. Hence, on the basis of this result, a long-run relationship exist among 
the variables. However, the obtained F-statistic (3.8201) in Nigeria’s empirical design is between the lower critical 
value bound I(0) and the upper critical value bound I(1). Hence, the test was inconclusive. Therefore, the 
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inconclusive outcome means that long-run and short-run models may be considered. The presence of a long-run 
link among the variables in these models supported the estimation of the short-run dynamic and long-run 
coefficients using the ARDL method. 
 
Table-4. Bounds Tests for the existence of cointegration. 
Country: Nigeria 
Test Statistic Value Lag Significance Level Bound Critical Values* Lower Bound  Upper Bound 
F-statistic 3.8201 2  I(0) I(1) 
   1% 5.17 6.36 
   5% 4.01 5.07 
   10% 3.47 4.45 
Country: Chad 
F-statistic 7.0852 2  I(0) I(1) 
   1% 5.17 6.36 
   5% 4.01 5.07 
   10% 3.47 4.45 
Note: Critical value bounds for the F-statistic at 95% confidence level from Pesaran et al. (2001). 
 
4.4. Results of the Long-run Relationship 
      
Table-5. Results for estimated long-run coefficients. 
Dependent Variable: Log(RGDPPC)       
Country: Nigeria 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 8.842870 1.272876 6.947158*** 0.0000 
GFCF -0.034514 0.024418 -1.413424 0.1704 
MILEXP 0.271693 0.305219 0.890158 0.3822 
TOPEN -0.002892 0.006278 -0.460646 0.6492 
Country: Chad 
C 5.590213 0.157538 35.484884*** 0.0000 
GFCF 0.001133 0.007661 0.147881 0.8838 
MILEXP 0.055174 0.019293 2.859723*** 0.0091 
TOPEN 0.009813 0.004467 2.196969** 0.0389 
          Note: *** and ** denote significance at 1% and 5% respectively.   
         
Table 5 depicts the estimated long-run results of the link between military outlay and economic growth. For 
Nigeria, gross fixed capital formation had a negative and insignificant relationship with economic growth contrary 
to expectation. The unfavourable investment climate in Nigeria is one of the likely reasons for this result. This 
finding contravenes the submissions of Duru and Ehidiamhen (2018) but agrees with the finding of Duru, Okafor, 
Adikwu, and Njoku (2020) and Duru and Ezenwe (2020). In addition, military outlay exerted a positive relationship 
with economic growth. However, it was not significant. This means that a unit increase in military outlay would 
result in a 0.27 per cent increase in economic growth. The non-significance of the military outlay variable may not 
be unrelated with the mismanagement and diversion of some of the military funds by military officials. This result 
contravenes the findings of Deger (1986); Deger and Somnath (1995); Dunne et al. (2002); Dunne (2010); Dunne 
(2012); Dunne and Tian (2015); Feeny (2005) and Arshad et al. (2017).  
However, the finding conforms to the results of the studies of Benoit (1978); Tiwari and Shahbaz (2011); 
Chairil et al. (2013); Apanisile and Okunlola (2014); Ajmair et al. (2018). Furthermore, openness to trade had a 
negative relationship with economic growth.  This suggests that a unit increase in trade openness would reduce 
economic growth by 0.003 per cent.  This indicates that trade openness does not encourage economic growth in 
Nigeria. One of the probable reasons for this may be the unfavourable investment climate in some parts of the 
country caused by insecurity. Another factor is the export of mainly primary products. This result corresponds 
with the suggestions of Rigobon and Rodrik (2005); Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999); Adhikary (2011); Bibi, Ahmad, 
and Rashid (2014); Qazi (2015); Olasode, Raji, Adedoyin, and Ademola (2015); Musila and Yiheyis (2015); Moyo, 
Nwabisa, and Hlalefang (2017); Moyo and Khobai (2018); Tyopev (2019); Duru et al. (2020) and Duru and Ezenwe 
(2020). However, the finding contravenes the suggestions of Nduka (2013); Olufemi (2004); Winters (2004); Sakyi 
(2011); Dao (2014); Ali and Abdullah (2015); Dabel (2016); Keho (2017); Yakubu and Akanegbu (2018); Elijah and 
Musa (2019) and Ajayi and Araoye (2019). 
In the case of the Republic of Chad, gross fixed capital formation exerted a positive and insignificant 
relationship with economic growth as expected. This implies that investment contributes to economic growth in 
Chad. This implies that a unit increase in investment would result in a 0.001 per cent increase in economic growth. 
This finding contravenes the submissions of Duru and Ezenwe (2020) and Duru et al. (2020) but finds an advocate 
in Duru and Ehidiamhen (2018). In addition, military outlay had a positive and significant relationship with 
economic growth. This implies that a unit increase in military outlay would result in a 0.06 per cent increase in 
economic growth. The result finds an advocate in Anfofum (2011). Furthermore, openness to trade had a positive 
and significant relationship with economic growth as expected.  This means that a unit increase in trade openness 
would increase economic growth by 0.01 per cent.  This indicates that trade openness promotes economic growth 
in Chad. This finding disagrees with the submissions of Rigobon and Rodrik (2005); Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999); 
Adhikary (2011); Bibi et al. (2014); Qazi (2015); Olasode et al. (2015); Musila and Yiheyis (2015); Moyo et al. 
(2017); Moyo and Khobai (2018); Tyopev (2019); Duru et al. (2020) and Duru and Ezenwe (2020). However, the 
result corresponds with the suggestions of Nduka (2013); Olufemi (2004); Winters (2004); Sakyi (2011); Dao 
(2014); Ali and Abdullah (2015); Dabel (2016); Keho (2017); Yakubu and Akanegbu (2018); Elijah and Musa (2019) 
and Ajayi and Araoye (2019). 
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4.5. Results of the Short-run Dynamic Model 
   
Table-6. Results of estimated short-run error correction model. 
Dependent Variable: Log(RGDPPC)      
Country: Nigeria 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(LOGRGDPPC(-1)) 0.337379 0.198269 1.701622* 0.1017 
D(GFCF) -0.004418 0.001613 -2.738142*** 0.0115 
D(GFCF(-1)) 0.002012 0.001666 1.207548 0.2390 
D(MILEXP) 0.001713 0.043600 0.039292 0.9690 
D(MILEXP(-1)) -0.013759 0.034303 -0.401105 0.6919 
D(TOPEN) -0.000343 0.000909 -0.376903 0.7096 
D(TOPEN(-1)) 0.001528 0.000839 1.821647* 0.0810 
ECMt-1 -0.135031 0.069106 -1.953971* 0.0625 
ECM = LOG(RGDPPC) - 0.0345*GFCF + 0.2717*MILEXP - 0.0029*TOPEN + 8.8429*C – 0.0142*D 
Country: Chad 
D(LOGRGDPPC(-1)) -0.146104 0.183191 -0.797550 0.4337 
D(GFCF) 0.000429 0.002953 0.145259 0.8858 
D(GFCF(-1)) -0.004188 0.002554 -1.639888 0.1153 
D(MILEXP) -0.007707 0.012817 -0.601300 0.5538 
D(MILEXP(-1)) -0.015610 0.011996 -1.301262 0.2066 
D(TOPEN) 0.000316 0.001427 0.221514 0.8267 
D(TOPEN(-1)) -0.002109 0.001560 -1.351632 0.1902 
ECMt-1 -0.430863 0.159071 -2.708629*** 0.0128 
ECM = LOG(RGDPPC) + 0.0011*GFCF + 0.0552*MILEXP + 0.0098*TOPEN + 5.5902*C + 0.0048*D 
Note: ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
         
The results of the short-run dynamic estimates are shown in Table 6. In the case of Nigeria, the short-run 
dynamic estimates to a great extent agree with the long-run estimates. Change in the log of real GDP had a 
positive and significant impact on economic growth in the first lag. On the other hand, gross fixed capital 
formation of the previous one year had a negative and significant link with economic growth. Change in military 
outlay exerted a positive and insignificant impact on real GDP in the short-run. This finding suggests that military 
outlay contributes to growth in the short-run in Nigeria.  
This implies that economic growth would increase by 0.002 per cent, should military outlay be increased by 
one unit. Change in trade openness exerted a negative and insignificant effect on economic growth in the short-run. 
The coefficient of ECMt-1, which is 14% implies that 14% of the previous deviation in economic growth from 
equilibrium is corrected by it within one year. The significance of the coefficient of the error correction term lagged 
by one period is an indication of long-run causality. Furthermore, the negative sign and significance of the 
coefficient of the error correction term to long-run stable equilibrium further corroborates the existence of a long-
run nexus between real GDP and the explanatory variables.  
However, for the Republic of Chad, change in the log of real GDP exerted a negative and insignificant impact 
on economic growth. The change in gross fixed capital formation had a positive and insignificant impact on 
economic growth in line with the long-run result. The change in military outlay had a negative and insignificant 
relationship with economic growth in the short run. The result means that if military outlay goes up by one unit, 
economic growth would decrease by 0.008 per cent. However, the change in trade openness had a positive and 
insignificant relationship with economic growth. The coefficient of ECMt-1, which is 43% implies that 43% of the 
previous deviation in economic growth from equilibrium is corrected by it within one year. The significance of the 
coefficient of the error correction term lagged by one period is an indication of long-run causality. Furthermore, 
the negative sign and high significance of the coefficient of the error correction term to long-run stable equilibrium 
further corroborates the existence of a long-run nexus between real GDP and the explanatory variables.  
 
4.6. Results of Toda and Yamamoto Multivariate Causality Test  
 
Table-7. Results of the granger causality test (TY augmented lags methods). 
Country: Nigeria 
 Sources of Causation 
Dependent/ Variable LOGRGDPPC 𝜒2 MILEXP 𝜒2 
MILEXP 2.3415 - 
LOGRGDPPC - 3.4432 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively. 
 
Table-8. Results of the granger causality test (TY Augmented lags methods). 
Country: Chad 
 Sources of Causation 
Dependent/ Variable LOGRGDPPC 𝜒2 MILEXP 𝜒2 
MILEXP 3.0432 - 
LOGRGDPPC - 3.2626 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % respectively. 
 
Toda and Yamamoto (TY) estimation results for Nigeria and the Republic of Chad is depicted in Table 7 and 
Table 8 respectively. The results in Table 7 revealed presence of no causality between real GDP per capita and 
military outlay for Nigeria. This finding suggests that there is no causal relationship between real GDP per capita 
and military outlay in Nigeria. In the case of Chad, the findings in Table 8 showed the existence of no causality 
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between real GDP per capita and military outlay. This result suggests that there is no causal relationship between 
real GDP per capita and military outlay in Chad. The implications of these findings for Nigeria and Chad is that 
they can pursue the policy objectives of defence and economic growth independently. These results contravene 
those of Chowdhury (1991); Dunne and Vougas (1999); Dakurah et al. (2001); Kollias, Naxakis, and Zarangas 
(2004); Lai, Huang, and Yang (2005); Tiwari and Shahbaz (2011). 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The empirical link between military expenditures and economic growth has been a very controversial issue in 
both developing and developed economies resulting in mixed results. Hence, this study contributed in a novel 
manner to the prevailing literature on military expenditures and economic growth by investigating the nexus 
between military outlay and economic growth in the Lake Chad Basin Countries with emphasis on Nigeria and the 
Republic of Chad using 1981-2019 and 1983-2019 respectively as ranges of data. The findings showed that military 
outlay contributes to economic growth in Nigeria. However, the non-significance of the military outlay variable 
may not be unrelated with the mismanagement and diversion of some of the funds meant for the military by 
military officials. On the other hand, military outlay exerted a positive and significant relationship with economic 
growth in the Republic of Chad. This implies that the resources allocated for the purpose of defence in the Republic 
of Chad is yielding the desired results. The Toda Yamamoto Multivariate Causality analysis showed no causal 
relationship between military outlay and economic growth in Nigeria and Chad respectively.  
This results means that Nigeria and Chad can pursue the policy objectives of defence and economic growth 
independently. Based on the discoveries of this study, the following recommendations are proffered: The 
policymakers of the governments of both countries should pursue the policy objectives of defence and economic 
growth independently. The government of Nigeria should ensure that the investment climate in place is conducive 
for the attraction of investments and flourishing of individual businesses. The Nigerian government should provide 
more credit facilities to investors at reduced interest rate with a view to restoring their confidence in the economy. 
The use of military funds in Nigeria could be enhanced by fighting corruption. Hence, the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), 
charged with the responsibility of fighting corruption should rise to the occasion and track down military officials 
that divert defence funds for individual gains. The existing policies for promotion of trade in the Republic of Chad 
should be sustained.  Furthermore, the government of Nigeria should implement proper fiscal and monetary 
measures through its right agencies to support trade. 
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